Loopholes in the ABOR whistle-
Conceptually the ABOR policy cannot be credible as a constructive contribution until
it requires 1) objective, independent decision-
The ABOR has created a whistle-
The ABOR whistle-
The remaining 19 serious loopholes in the ABOR whistle-
Loopholes in ABOR policy
"6-
1. The Purpose section (6-
scientific misconduct as a prerequisite for adverse actions against those challenging it, attempts to obtain deportation orders or otherwise threaten visas, requests for government investigations, and changes in academic standards. The proposal must cover
"any discrimination" that materially prejudices the interest of a person protected by the Policy.
2. The Purpose also defines a whistleblower as one who suffers an adverse action after making a disclosure. That is tardy. Under federal law, a person becomes a whistleblower by engaging in freedom of dissent and making the disclosure. It is not
necessary to wait for retaliation.
3. The proposal's Applicability section (6-
4. The same section only bans personnel actions "in knowing retaliation for" whistleblowing. It does not matter to the public whether there was ill will or hard feelings behind discrimination. What is significant is whether the personnel action may conceal
misconduct by cutting off the flow of information from those willing to bear witness
-
by banning discrimination taken "because of" protected activity, as Congress did
in the Whistleblower Protection Act of 1989. ("WPA") The causal link removes the
irrelevant requirement for victims to prove animus. For consistency, sections 6-
and 6-
5. The same section limits protection to an actual "disclosure" of misconduct. To comply with federal law in over a dozen statutes and state law such as the District of Columbia, the Policy should protect against discrimination taken because an employee is "about to" engage in protected activity. This precludes gag orders and preemptive strikes that silence whistleblowers in advance. The Policy also should protect those "perceived" of engaging in protected activity, to guard against guilt by association. These indirect contexts often can have the most significant potential to lock in secrecy by silencing
employees. For consistency, sections 6-
6. The proposal should be amended to protect "refusal to violate the law." This is whistleblowing through deeds rather than words. Walking the talk is of far greater significance to the public. Freedom of dissent can be relatively ineffective in stopping a
fait accompli.
7. The definition for "abuse of authority" in section 6-
"buddy systems" or other insider favoritism are a common dimension for abuse of authority, and must be covered within the boundary of protected whistleblowing disclosures.
8. The definition in section 6-
additional forms of harassment relevant for a university context, see #1, supra.)
In order to preclude potentially limitless loopholes, these forms of harassment because
of protected activity should be added to the list, which should be presented as "examples
of" adverse personnel actions, rather than the boundaries. Consistent with #1, supra,
adverse personnel actions should include "any discrimination," which materially prejudices
an employee’s interests, instead of limiting it to "an employment-
9. For consistency with federal law, the definition of "mismanagement" in section
6-
10. Corrective action to solve problems or impose accountability for misconduct is
the point of any whistleblower protection statute. As a result, laws such as the
federal WPA provide for mandatory investigations and reports to resolve the allegations
in any disclosures that qualify as protected speech. Unfortunately, section 6-
11. Sections 6-
employee still loses if the action were taken "for legitimate reasons or cause under university rules and policies." Subsection J.4 applies a preponderance of the evidence test for all contexts. This burden of proof is indefensible. It constructs an unprecedented legal barrier for whistleblowers to win when asserting their rights. It is inconsistent with existing federal law, the HHS proposed regulations, and the emerging trend from local to
international law. The modern burden of proof for whistleblower disputes is that an alleged victims establishes a prima facie case by demonstrating that protected activity is a "contributing factor" to alleged discrimination. At that point, the burden of proof shifts to the employer to prove legitimate, independent justification "by clear and convincing evidence." If the Policy is to have any legitimacy, that standard must be institutionalized for all prohibited discrimination against any person protected by the Policy. It is the standard governing cases in the federal Whistleblower Protection Act, analogous federal laws for nuclear and aviation workers, state and municipal statutes ranging from California to the District of Columbia, and even international institutions such as the Organization of American States and the World Bank. Federal statutory law requires this
standard in the proposed HHS regulations that will cover Arizona universities where PHS funding is involved for medical research. As a result, failure to apply it in the Policy guarantees universities will have to adjudicate whistleblower cases under two different sets of ground rules to determine a victor.
12. The same flaw exists in section 6-
and should remain largely dormant. This is particularly true, since the Policy precludes any judicial review. The solution is simple. As provided by voluntary HHS guidelines already in effect for alternative disputes resolution of whistleblower cases, both parties should select a decisionmaker by mutual consent. The decisionmaker's fee should be split if the case is dismissed on preliminary grounds, or paid by the university if the hearing proceeds.
13. Section 6-
14. Section 6-
Resolution, imposed either after negotiated agreement or by a decisionmaker whom the parties selected through mutual consent. In the absence of that evenhanded approach, reprisal victims should avoid the Trojan Horse offered by this Policy.
15. Section 6-
law, means it is structurally impossible for most whistleblowers who prevail to be made whole. Common additional consequences include associated medical bills, higher interest rates due to interruption of income, and similar indirect but tangible side effects of harassment. Many whistleblower laws or torts provide extra compensation through punitive damages or double back pay. At a minimum, however, any credible whistleblower protection policy must allow the harassment victim to get back to even through being made whole. This Policy fails to pass that minimum test.
16. The Policy also fails to provide attorney fees and related litigation costs for employees who prevail. This also makes credibility hopeless. The proposal bars university counsel if an employee has no attorney, but that is disingenuous at best in a
system where the university picks the hearing examiner. Counsel is a necessity for any realistic expectation of not pursuing an exercise in futility. Fees and costs commonly reach five to six figures. Unless that expense can be recovered, whistleblowers
cannot afford to assert their rights, even to win. Without a meaningful right to counsel through reimbursement after prevailing, the Policy is a mirage.
17. Unlike the proposed ORI regulations, there is no provision for interim relief, either to neutralize faits accompli causing irreparable harm, or during appeals. Delays could prolong the consequences of harassment for semesters or years. That could limit many whistleblowers to Pyrrhic victories, at best.
18. The Policy should include a transfer preference for whistleblowers who prevail, where relevant. It can be unrealistic to go back to work for a supervisor whom an employee has just defeated in a lawsuit. In order to prevent repetitive reprisals that
cancel the Policy’s impact, those who prevail must have a strong transfer preference for a realistic chance at a fresh start after winning.
19. For viability, the Policy must contain an "anti-